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The charm of jurisdictions: 
a modern version of 
Solomon’s judgment?
From a perspective of international law, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) pioneers particularly in terms 
of its (extraterritorial) application. Whereas in international 
law, which is based on the Westphalian notion of exclusive 
state sovereignty, this sovereignty is usually restricted to the 
state’s own territory and allows for an extraterritorial 
application of human rights only in exceptional 
circumstances, the GDPR prominently standardises the 
domestic-market principle in Article 3(2) GDPR. The 
principle imposes obligations on processors or controllers 
that are based outside of the European Union (EU), given 
that they offer goods or services to people inside the EU or 
monitor the behaviour of people within the EU. This brings 
up an important question: Does Art. 3 (2) GDPR indicate a 
structural shift towards more expansive exercise of 
jurisdiction in cyberspace? Such a shift could have 
ramifications for the regulation of cyberspace well beyond 
data protection law: While the discussions around 
jurisdiction in cyberspace have still not come to a broad 
consensus, international human rights law might be able to 
learn from data protection law how to protect and safeguard 
human rights online. The Snowden revelations have shown a 
glimpse of the global surveillance apparatus and have also 
triggered many debates about the protection of the rights to 
privacy online and their limits as to the scope of the various 
treaty regimes. Focusing on the international right to privacy 
and the right to data protection, it may not be far-fetched to 
allow for a broader exercise of jurisdiction in the digital era.
The default rule in international law: No extraterritorial 
jurisdiction
The principles of jurisdiction in public international law as 
well as international relations are of fundamental 
importance: They concern the allocation between states and 
other entities, such as the EU, of the competence to regulate 
daily life. It includes the competence of a state to secure the 
differences that make each state a distinct society. Equally, 
the state may define its coercive powers. Jurisdiction is 
closely linked to the sovereign equality and territorial 
sovereignty of states (cf. Art. 2 (1) Charter of the United 
Nations [UNC]). Already the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) held in its famous Lotus case:
“the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that – 
failing the existence of a permissive rule of the 
contrary – it may not exercise its power in 
any form in the territory of another State. In 
this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; 
it cannot be exercised by a State outside its 
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a 
convention”
(PCIJ, „Lotus“, Judgment No. 9, 1927, Ser. A, 
No 10, pp. 18-19).
Therefore, the default rule in international law is that a state 
cannot exercise jurisdiction with extraterritorial effects 
unless there is a permissive rule to the contrary.
Jurisdiction also applies in cyberspace
As public international law is traditionally state-centric, the 
question has been given new attention as to the 
continuously emerging importance of the cyberspace and 
the state’s role within it. During the early times of the 
Internet as we know it today, cyberspace has often been 
regarded as a separate, de-territorialized space. Most 
prominently John Perry Barlow has called for the cyberspace 
to be independent from state interference. Today it has 
become evident that even though cyberspace is largely run 
by private entities, states do play important roles in the way 
it functions. Governments can block traffic and largely 
intercept communication.   Given that the physical 
infrastructure of cyberspace is built upon a state’s territory, 
cyberspace is not immune from national jurisdiction. 
Moreover, attempts to categorize cyberspace as a global
common, such as outer space and the high seas, has proven 
equally difficult as cyberspace is man-made, fully intangible, 
highly changeable, and the exploitation of data does not lead 
to its destruction. Hence, although cyberspace has a sui 
generis character it is not autonomous from the exercise of 
a state’s jurisdiction.
Yet, it remains the question on which basis a state (or in the 
case of the EU a supranational organization) can exercise 
jurisdiction in cyberspace. In general, the principles of 
territoriality and personality are the main bases of 
international law. As for the applicability in cyberspace it 
appears natural to stipulate national jurisdiction for a 
situation with a nexus to the domestic territory. If e.g. data is 
stored on a server located within a state, this state exercises 
jurisdiction over the server and the stored data. For the 
personality principle, it becomes somewhat less simple. The 
active personality principle does not pose too many 
problems. A company based in the EU processing personal 
data outside of the EU is still bound by the GDPR, regardless 
of where it processes the data (Art. 3 (1) GDPR). The passive 
personality principle proves to be more complicated. In the 
context of the GDPR it means that any company offering 
services to a person in the EU must abide by the GDPR even 
if it has no other “nexus” to the EU. Although this might be 
beneficial from an EU point of view, it imposes obligations on 
companies which simultaneously are obliged to comply with 
the law of the territorial state in which they operate. Hence, 
the passive personality principle produces extraterritorial 
effects. Remembering the PCIJ dictum in the Lotus case this 
brings up the question: Is a permissive rule emerging which 
allows for the exercise of jurisdiction based on the passive 
personality principle?
The passive personality principle as a basis for jurisdiction 
in international law
Exercising jurisdiction based on the passive personality 
principle is not a new phenomenon in international law. It 
has been applied in singular circumstances such as against a 
US citizen by Mexico already in 1885 who was based in the 
USA and alleged of libelling a Mexican national in a US 
newspaper. Simply because the victim was Mexican, Mexico 
assumed jurisdiction over the perpetrator. The USA denied 
any jurisdiction for Mexico. However, recently there might 
have been a trend in international law in favour of accepting 
the type of passive personality jurisdiction. One of the 
Separate Opinions in the Arrest Warrant case noted that at 
least for some kind of criminal offenses the passive 
personality principle seems to meet little opposition 
nowadays. On the other side, one should be careful to simply 
derive a general acceptance from several instances of 
criminal law cases and more precisely to cases that 
concerned the prosecution of terrorism. Especially when 
analyzing jurisprudence in the field of international human 
rights law it is doubtful whether the principle equally applies 
more generally. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) for instance has pointed out that the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) generally does not govern the actions of states which 
are not parties to it; neither based on some kind of effects 
for nationals of a member state nor on the classical passive 
personality principle. More specifically it has found that the 
mere publishing of a person’s information does not 
constitute the necessary nexus that would suffice for a 
jurisdiction. Hence, it is not yet clear if the exercise of 
jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle in the 
GDPR is indicative of a broader trend towards the 
acceptance of the exercise of such jurisdiction in other areas 
of international law.
How to resolve jurisdictional conflicts: Insights from other 
areas of international law
The reason against any broadening of a state’s jurisdiction 
beyond its national borders is evident — a state seeking to 
expand jurisdictional power hereby restricts the jurisdiction 
of other states. Instances of overlapping or concurrent 
jurisdiction are not welcome. If such situations indeed occur, 
the question arises as to the priority of one state’s 
jurisdiction. Existing possible answers constitute blocking 
statutes such as the European Council Resolution 2271/96. 
Blocking statutes may be an answer, but they are, however, 
no solution to the problem. Another proposal (often adopted 
by US courts) tries to balance the interests at stake: the 
interest of applying the domestic law vs. the interest of not 
applying it. A more convincing solution may be found in 
international economic law. One example is the antitrust 
cooperation procedure established by the European 
Community and the USA (EC-US Agreement on the 
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement 
of their Competition Laws).
So far, in terms of conflicting cyber jurisdictions there is no 
perfect solution yet. Nevertheless, such solution must 
ensure the right of every state to safeguard the right to 
protect its own sovereignty without violating the 
sovereignty of another state. And more importantly, it should 
be found fast.
Is data protection law the answer?
It is interesting that the GDPR in the name of protecting the 
right to data protection boldly establishes the domestic-
market principle thereby exactly including mere effects on 
EU citizens regardless of the location or nationality of the 
data controller. One must be careful when determining the 
current international legal status of such rules. The State of 
California already applies such approach, given that there 
does not exist a federal data protection law. 
Correspondingly, other new data protection rules apply the 
same standard, such as the Brazilian General Data Protection 
Law that will enter into force in 2020. As long as the level of 
data protection remains similar, potential jurisdictional 
conflicts between data protection laws will most likely 
remain resolvable in practice. However, disputes will arise in 
situations when the material laws differ from one another. 
So far, states seem to claim as much jurisdictional space as 
they can get. Material clashes of laws are likely to appear 
sooner or later that could lead to undesired legal 
uncertainties. In a practical way, a solution could be sought 
in escaping to the rules of enforcement of the GDPR, as 
enforcement jurisdiction is generally regarded as strictly 
limited to the territory. Yet, this way one would de facto
ignore the actual legal problem at hand. The establishment 
of cooperation mechanisms as mentioned above will most 
likely fail due to political differences. The most probable 
solution will be a sovereignty-friendly, thus restrictive 
interpretation of Article 3(2) GDPR. A glimpse of a possible 
fix might show the case of Google Inc. v. CNIL (Case C-
507/17), currently pending before the European Court of 
Justice. EU Advocate General Szpunar has recently 
expressed in his opinion, that the territorial scope of the 
right to be forgotten should be limited to the EU, thereby 
denying extra-territorial applicability. The final decision to 
the case will not solve all of the issues with regard to scope 
of the GDPR. But it will certainly assist in the search for a 
wise “Solomonic” decision, and show whether Europe is 
indeed the “true” mother of data protection.
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